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Abstract.  Welfare-state European model has been profoundly 
affected by the economic crisis. In this context, most of the EU member 
states decided to respond by undertaking short run policy measures. 
Government spending has been extended in order to create new jobs and 
to stimulate economic recovery. The fact that the EU member states are 
still facing the crisis suggests that the policies implemented were 
inefficient. Moreover, EU officials seem trapped in a vicious circle 
dominated by the crisis growing effects and their own commitments to 
bring back economic recovery. This study emphasizes the policy 
measures’ inconsistencies and, as a consequence, the failure of economic 
recovery initiatives. 
 
Keywords:  economic crisis; welfare state; budget cuts; financial 
stimulus; economic recovery. 
 
JEL Codes: E24 E32 E65. 
REL Codes: 8D, 8H, 13C, 20C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XX (2013), No. 2(579), pp. 69-80 Marius-Cristian Pană 
	
70 
Welfare-state European model has been profoundly affected by the 
economic crisis. Government deficits and huge public debt have facilitated the 
spreading of its negative effects. In this context most of the EU member states 
decided to respond by undertaking short run policies. European officials had to 
embrace budget cuts policies and to implement stimulus packages in order to 
countervail the effects of the crisis. As can be seen, their goal was to diminish 
budget deficits rather than implementing real reforms. Stimulus packages 
consisted mostly in extending government spending in order to preserve and 
create new jobs. The fact that the EU member states are still facing the crisis 
suggests that the policies implemented were inefficient.  
The main problem with the adopted policies is that they are contradictory. 
While budget cuts should mean diminishing government spending, stimulus 
packages generates exactly the opposite effect. The huge dimension of state’s 
interventionism in the EU doubled by the dissimulated will of reforming 
determined budget cuts only for compensation of employees and social 
benefits. In order to stimulate economic recovery most of the EU member states 
adopted the Keynesian solution of enhancing government spending in some 
strategic domains. The real reforms necessary to stimulate economic recovery 
and private initiative lacked or, in the best case, were considered of secondary 
importance.  
This is why the crisis’s effects persist for the most of the EU member 
states and, moreover, tend to become critical for some of them despite the 
budget cuts measures. The explanation for this is simple: governments must 
respond properly to budget constraints but, at the same time, the huge 
dimension of the welfare state is an impediment mainly for implementing the 
social benefits’ cuts. The dimension of state intervention is too big for the 
budget cuts to be easily implemented and without resistance. This is also the 
cause of the fact that EU citizens are mainly adapted to the benefits of social 
assistance and, hence, they are not willing to give them up.  
Creating new jobs is the main reason for increasing public spending on 
various projects in the most of the EU member states. The main error of such 
measures consists in ignoring public spending’s long term implications for the 
economy. Although it may seem like putting money to the other pocket of the 
public budget, the reality is that such spending generates only deficits. The need 
for fiscal consolidation calls for constraints which negatively affect private 
sector, either by raising taxes, either by inflation or both. Therefore, EU 
member states seem trapped in a vicious circle dominated by the crisis growing 
effects and their own commitments to stimulate economic recovery. 
This study emphasizes those stated above. In order to attend this purpose 
it succinctly exposing the policy measures that the EU member states have 
implemented during the economic crisis. A review of the economic crisis: solutions and failures in the European Union 
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1.  The end of the welfare state illusion and the austerity solution 
   
At the end of the 2008, EU member states adopted budget cuts policy 
measures. The potential crash of the Eurozone and of the entire EU political and 
economic construction revitalized discussions about the commitments 
concerning budget deficits. Under these circumstances, EU member states 
decided to bring their own budget deficits down to 3 percent of GDP by 2013.  
One must emphasize that budget cuts are not anti-crisis policy measures, 
but consequences of it. This assertion is logically and chronologically 
consistent. An advantage of this disambiguation consists in identifying a 
positive relation between welfare state dimensions in various EU member states 
and the intensity of budget cuts policy measures they adopted. Policy makers 
avoided to emphasize the real reason for the budget cuts. Otherwise, they had to 
criticize the illusive welfare state benefits which, actually, they continued to 
finance at the expense of the same deficient public budgets.  
Table 1 
Budget cuts and government spending, 2009 
 Budget  cuts 
(%GDP) 
Government spending 
(%GDP) 
 2010-2015 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 0.9  52.6 52.6 50.5 
Belgium 5.3  53.7 52.8 53.4 
France 4.5  56.8 56.6 56.0 
Germany 3.0  48.2 47.7 45.3 
Hungary 1.6  51.4 49.8 49.6 
Greece 10.7  53.8 50.2 50.1 
Italy 1.6  51.9 50.4 49.9 
Portugal 6.6  49.8 51.3 48.9 
Spain 8.2  46.3 45.6 43.6 
United Kingdom  6.0  51.5 50.4 49.0 
Note: Budget cuts are intended during 2010-2015. 
Source: Paolo Manasse – Budget cuts across Europe: Coordination or diktat?, 24 July 2010, 
www.voxeu.org; Eurostat. 
 
Budget cuts initiatives ought to be analyzed in correlation with the budget 
deficits in the member states. Associating them with the public spending one 
can understand the real dimension of government intervention, on the one hand, 
and the resistance against austerity measures in some countries, on the other. 
Budget cuts were mainly oriented toward diminishing public workers’ 
compensations or freezing them. Therefore, citizens protested violently against 
austerity measures taken by the government officials in countries like France 
and Spain. The main explanation for this situation resides in the welfare state 
incentives. Thus, during the boom period, the government spending has been 
increased because of the growing number of public employees. An analysis of Marius-Cristian Pană 
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the public spending with the compensation of employees reveals the earlier 
conclusion. As can be seen in the figure below, compensations have increased 
in 2009 compared to the previous year in most of the EU member states and the 
trend persisted for the next year in some countries, although the EU economy 
was already confronting the crisis. 
Table 2 
Government compensation spending and social benefits 
 
Compensation spending (%GDP) Social benefits (%GDP) 
1996 2008 2009 2010 1996 2008 2009  2010 
Belgium 11.9  12.0 12.7 12.6 22.6 23.3 25.4  25.1 
France 13.6  12.8 13.5 13.4 22.7 23.5 25.4  25.7 
Germany 8.8  7.4 8.0 7.9 26.0 23.9 26.2  25.5 
Hungary 10.8  11.6 11.5 10.9 16.0 18.6 19.4  18.5 
Greece 9.6  12.0 13.4 12.1 13.7 19.6 21.1  20.8 
Ireland 9.5  11.2 12.2 11.8 12.5 14.2 17.3  18.0 
Italy 11.3  10.8 11.2 11.1 18.5 20.3 22.0  22.1 
Portugal 12.7  12.0 12.6 12.2 12.7 19.3 21.9  21.9 
Spain 11.2  10.9 12.0 11.9 15.6 15.2 17.7  18.3 
United Kingdom  10.5  11.0 11.6 11.4 14.5 13.3 15.1  15.1 
Poland 10.5  10.0 10.2 10.1 18.6 16.1 16.9  17.0 
Czech Republic  7.2  7.3 7.8 7.6 16.4 17.5 19.5  19.7 
Bulgaria 7.2  9.2 9.9 9.3 9.2 11.6 13.7  14.3 
Romania 6.4  10.5 10.9 9.8 10.1 11.0 13.3  13.8 
Source: Eurostat Statistical Books – Government finance statistics, Summary tables -2/2011, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EK-11-002/EN/KS-EK-11-002-EN.PDF. 
 
Budget cuts solution becomes extremely sensitive matter when social 
benefits must be reduced or, in some cases, eliminated. As can be seen in the 
previous table, states that form welfare state European model’s core, namely 
France and Germany, register the highest social benefits-to-GDP ratios. 
Surprisingly, these ratios rose in 2009 compared to the previous year. In some 
cases ratios rose insignificantly (Hungary and Poland supplemented their social 
spending only with 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points (pp) of GDP, respectively). 
Other countries (Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Bulgaria 
and Romania) extended social benefits with at least 2 pp of GDP in 2009 and 
even for the next year. A possible explanation for this is the decline in real GDP 
in 2009. Therefore, the social benefits-to-GDP ratio increased for the most of 
the EU member states.  
Another severe criticism to budget cut solution relies on the economic 
deficiencies induced by the consumption decrease. The economic crisis will 
persist because consumption financed through social spending will fall 
inevitably and private firms will be affected. Moreover, the fall in consumption 
spending is directly correlated with the social benefits-to-GDP ratio. Accepting 
this argument means also admitting the fact that increasing compensation of 
employees and social spending was beneficial for private sector. This reasoning A review of the economic crisis: solutions and failures in the European Union 
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is profoundly fallacious because it ignores the government spending-to-GDP 
ratio which has been increased altogether with the GDP during the year 2010. 
In this particular case the only way to extend public spending is by extracting 
funds using fiscal policy.  
Stating that private spending or its governmental substitute is the 
“engine” of economic growth emphasizes a severe misunderstanding of the free 
market economy and creates a false image of an economic recovery coordinated 
by public policies. The alleged beneficial function of increasing governmental 
spending on aggregate demand goes beyond the borders of an economy when it 
comes to argue that diminishing the public spending will negatively affect the 
recovery of the global economy
(1).  
Such policy measures negatively affect and delay economic recovery, 
forcing entrepreneurs to make inadequate decisions. Moreover, the entire 
economic environment is oriented toward inefficient decision making. One 
cannot explain the private firms’ constant fear of decreasing aggregate demand 
but by accepting the mere fact that public policies concerning compensation of 
employees and social benefits created a structure of distorted incentives. The 
consequence of demand contraction would be the business plans’ readjustment.  
	
Table 3 
Multipliers used to evaluate fiscal packages 
 Government 
consumption 
Transfers to 
household 
Tax cuts 
An 1  An 2 An 1 An 2 An 1  An 2 
Belgium 0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1  0.2 
France 0.6  0.7 0.4 0.7 0.2  0.4 
Germany 0.4  0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2  0.3 
Hungary 0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1  0.2 
Greece 0.5  0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2  0.4 
Ireland 0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1  0.2 
Italy 0.6  0.7 0.4 0.7 0.2  0.4 
Poland 0.4  0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2  0.3 
Portugal 0.4  0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2  0.3 
Czech Republic  0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1  0.2 
Spain 0.5  0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2  0.4 
United Kingdom  0.5  0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2  0.4 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Interim Report March 2009, Chapter 3 - The Effectiveness 
and Scope of Fiscal Stimulus, 2009, www.oecdbookshop.org. 
 
Another argument that shows the over evaluated importance of public 
spending resides in the main pillar of the entire Keynesian theory edifice. This 
theory of government interventionism introduced the concept of multiplier 
equally associated with the private and the public spending. Accepting, even as 
a mere example, the importance of aggregate demand stimulation, one can 
easily observe that the impact of diminishing public spending on economic Marius-Cristian Pană 
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performances is insignificant. This is the cause of public spending’s multipliers 
small values (lower than 1) for different European countries which means a low 
effect on the aggregate output. 
Resuming those stated above one can argue that budget cuts policy 
measures were a mere reaction of the EU member states to the fact that welfare 
state European model could not be financed anymore. These policies didn’t 
reach their goal because they concentrated mainly on preserving oversized 
government interventionism. Real reform policies were replaced by stimulus 
packages that distorted firms’ readjusting efforts. Therefore, the fact that EU 
member states still face economic crisis is a consequence of institutional 
rigidity implemented by the welfare state European model.   
 
2.  Stimulus packages and the failure of economic recovery 
 
More than budget cuts policy measures were needed in order to fight 
against crisis. Therefore, EU member states implemented stimulus packages as 
economic recovery policies. Mainly, these packages consisted in increasing 
governmental spending. The purpose was to create new jobs and preserve the 
existing ones. According to EU Commission (2009, p. 36) the official short 
term policy was “keeping people in employment” and it was to be implemented 
using massive financial stimulus packages. Member states had to maintain the 
existing jobs in order to avoid the negative effects and “human costs of the 
crisis” (Commission, 2009, p. 38). 
One can easily identify that the policy measures implemented were 
contradictory. While budget cuts try to diminish public spending, financing 
stimulus packages generates exactly the opposite effect. Moreover, budget cuts 
should have meant also reducing taxation. But as this study emphasizes, the 
economic logic is replaced by the “budgetary” one due to stimulus packages.       
 The most popular use of public money is financing infrastructure projects 
in order to increase the aggregate outcome. The main argument of using stimulus 
packages is based on the Keynesian theory according to which “investing” in 
infrastructure generates multiplying effects. Job losses and fall in aggregate 
demand fueled interventionism. Therefore, increasing number of IMF and OECD 
studies aimed to validate empirically the multiplying effects of governmental 
spending on infrastructure. Using various and controversial estimation techniques 
of public spending, these studies reach the same conclusion: the multiplier effect 
of infrastructure spending is stronger than the others
(2). 
Because of the controversies, some of these studies advocate for an even-
minded use of multiplying effects as arguments for government intervention 
policies (Cogan et al., 2009, pp. 8). Cwik and Wieland (2009, p. 17) and 
Marinas (2010, p. 64) emphasize the threat of increasing government spending A review of the economic crisis: solutions and failures in the European Union 
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on private consumption and investment. The excessive optimism concerning the 
multiplying effects originates from ignoring the ability of economic agents to 
anticipate the future evolution of the economy. So, they expect rising taxes in 
order to finance growing public spending and, therefore, consumption and 
investment will decrease because of the crowding out effect. Ono (2009,   
pp. 4-5) offers similar conclusion. Other studies emphasize the inefficiency of 
public spending multiplier comparing to the fiscal one. Despite the Keynesian 
theory’s prescriptions, private spending falls in response to growing 
government spending which means a value below unity for the governmental 
spending multiplier (Ramey, 2012, pp. 20-21). 
Therefore, EU member states launched massive infrastructure spending 
programs. 21.53 billion euros were spent in 2009 (0.17% of GDP) and 10.34 
billion were intended to be spent in 2010 (0.08% of GDP). Most of these 
expenses (13.7 billion euros) are dedicated to transportation infrastructure 
(Commission, 2009, p. 53). 
The policy measures implemented by the member states, although largely 
accepted, have many deficiencies concerning exactly their expected benefits. 
Therefore, it is fallaciously argued that an increase in aggregate demand will 
allow firms to exist on the market while the public money used to finance the 
economy will be restored through the tax system. It seems like economy’s 
public financing means putting money in the other pocket. This conclusion is 
wrong because budget deficits will occur and financing them will lead to an 
increasingly public debt. 
Table 4 
Government spending on infrastructure (%GDP) 
  Spending on infrastructure
Belgium 0.11
France 0.22
Germany 0.17
Austria 0.35
Poland 1.10
Portugal 0.18
Czech Republic  0.33
Spain 0.84
United Kingdom  0.12
Source: European Commission - The EU's response to support the real 
economy during the economic crisis: an overview of Member States' 
recovery measures, Occasional Papers 51, July 2009. 
 
This is exactly what happened in the EU during the crisis. Budget deficit 
reached its highest level (6.8% of GDP) in 2009 and 2010 and public debt grew 
from 62.3% of GDP in 2008 to 80.3% of GDP in 2010
(3) (Commission, 2011,  
p. 17). As can be seen in the chart below (Figure 1), EU member states 
accumulated growing budget deficits during 2009. Some of them (Belgium, Marius-Cristian Pană 
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Germany and Austria) had small deficits in the previous year. Others (Greece, 
Ireland, Spain, and United Kingdom) continued to accumulate deficits although 
they had already one of the biggest figures across the EU. In other cases, like 
Portugal, the deficit almost tripled during 2009 comparing to the previous year.  
Budget cuts policy measures implemented in the next two years 
determined smaller budget deficits for most of the EU member states. But the 
damage has already been done: increasingly public debt has been accumulated 
because of the stimulus packages, banks’ bailouts and external credit. 
Therefore, member states had to accept a two-track crisis, including the 
sovereign debt one. Public debt accumulated constantly during 2008-2011 and 
in some countries (Romania and Ireland) has doubled its value.  
 
 
Source: Eurostat newsrelease, Euroindicators, 149/2012, october 2012,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22102012-AP/EN/2-22102012-AP-EN.PDF. 
Figure 1. Budget deficit, 2008-2011 
 
 
Source: Eurostat newsrelease, Euroindicators, 149/2012, october 2012,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22102012-AP/EN/2-22102012-AP-EN.PDF. 
 
Figure 2. Public debt, 2008-2011 
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Extending budget deficits forced EU member states to implement fiscal 
consolidation measures. The adopted solution was budget cuts policy measures. 
Even, as stated above, the budget deficits decreased the accumulation of 
increasing public debt tends to anticipate the failure of fiscal consolidation 
measures. An argument for this is the attitude adopted by the member states. 
Most of the EU member states didn’t resist the temptation of increasing taxes, 
despite the fact that many studies emphasize the negative impact of such policy 
measures (Alesina et al., 2012, p. 26). These studies argue that adjusting public 
spending doesn’t generate recession, despite the severe critics against reducing 
government spending. On the contrary, private spending tends to grow due to 
lower tax expectations. 
 
Table 5 
Public debt during the crisis 
 2008-2011  evolution  (%)
Belgium 9.6
France 26.1
Germany 20.5
Austria 13.5
Greece 51.1
Ireland   139.1
Italy 13.8
Poland 19.7
Portugal 50.8
Czech Republic  42.2
Spain 72.4
United Kingdom  62.5
Romania 149.3
EU 27 32.6
Note: Refference year 2008. 
Sursa: Own calculation based on data available in Eurostat 
newsrelease, Euroindicators, 149/2012, october 2012,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22102012-
AP/EN/2-22102012-AP-EN.PDF. 
 
But the fiscal arrangements in the EU reveal exactly the opposite of those 
stated above. Tax reductions, level of taxation or regulations are far from being 
in place. Most of the EU member states choose to increase taxation in order to 
attain fiscal consolidation. Therefore, income taxes and social contributions 
increased (Commission, 2012a, p. 31). Despite the fact that corporate tax has 
been maintained constant in most of the EU member states, tax burden reached 
38.4% of GDP in 2010 (Commission, 2012b, p. 26). 
Therefore, one can emphasize the failure of stimulus packages concerning 
their main objective: preserving and creating new jobs. The number of job Marius-Cristian Pană 
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losses in the EU during the crisis amounts about 5 million and unemployment 
rate kept rising and reached 10% in April 2012 (Commission, 2012c, p. 6). 
EU member states that have the biggest financial difficulties are also 
confronted with the most severe unemployment rates (Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal). An interesting exception is the case of Germany. The 
unemployment rate fell in this country for the last three years consecutively. An 
analysis concerning various economic sectors’ contribution to this situation 
may be useful. Germany’s economy performances in this matter are based 
mainly on the contribution to employment of the construction sector and non-
market services (notably public administration). Not surprisingly, the latter 
generated net employment gains in most of the EU member states. The 
construction sector’s contribution to employment has been negative except for a 
few countries, despite the fact that it was the main beneficiary of the stimulus 
packages. In Germany’s case, construction industry and non-market services 
stimulated employment with 3.5% and 3.2%, respectively. Similar situation is 
registered in Belgium (3.3% and 5.0%, respectively) and Austria (0.4% and 
3.8%, respectively) (Commission, 2012c, p. 23). Unemployment rate decreased 
for both of the EU member states during the year 2011, but in the case of 
Austrian economy, employment growth occurred mainly in the public elastic 
administration). 
 
 
Source: European Commission - Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2012, European 
Economy, no. 5, September 2012. 
 
Figure 3. Unemployment rate, 2008-2011 
 
Analyzing labor market data, one can argue that unemployment rates 
decreased mainly as a consequence of public administration’s net employment 
gains, despite the stimulus packages implemented. In other economic sectors 
like industry and agriculture job creation was negative as a result of institutional 
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rigidity and lack of reforms. On this background, expectations concerning job 
creation are modest: unemployment rate will maintain relatively constant 
despite insignificant employment growth (Commission, 2012c, p. 44). 
Those stated above suggest the need for labor market institutional reform. 
The measures implemented didn’t reach their goal because they are 
contradictory with the proper institutional frame needed to encourage private 
initiative and stimulate the existing business. Many EU member states adopted 
job creation policy measures based mainly on wage subsidies. These measures 
failed because of the high tax burden on labor generated, among other causes, 
by the member states’ goal of fiscal consolidation
(4).      
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU member states seem to be trapped between interventionist 
policies and the financial pressure they generate. In absence of institutional 
reform needed to encourage investment, economic crisis will persist. Simplified 
business regulations and adjusted bureaucracy frame can reduce tax burden in 
the economy and stimulate recovery. In other words, more economic freedom 
means getting out of the crisis, while government interventionism means 
exactly the opposite.     
       
	
Notes 
	
(1)  Because of these precarious concerns government officials argue for “stronger domestic 
demand growth” in countries like Germany and Japan (Moore, 2010). The argument is the 
spillover effects induced by the growing aggregate demand in the two countries. The 
Keynesian multiplier theory was proved to be empirically fallacious through various 
simulations. According to these simulations, the impact of increasing public spending in 
Germany on the real GDP of France and Italy would have been insignificant and decreasing 
during 2009-2011. Thus, the real GDP of France could have grown with 0.012% in the 
fourth quarter of 2010;  the real GDP of Italy would have decrease with 0.049% in the same 
period of time (Cwik, Wieland, 2009, p.16). 
(2)  1.8 is the value of this multiplier and only 0.6 for the fiscal multiplier according to one of 
the most optimistic estimation based on such studies (IMF, 2009, p. 31).  
(3)  This negative public finance evolution cannot be entirely explained by the stimulus 
packages implemented. EU member states adopted also policy measures in order to sustain 
the financial system.  
(4)  Employer social security contribution rate is over 20% of average wage and the total tax 
wedge is over 30% for most of the EU member states according to the available data for 
2011 (Commission, 2012c, p. 39). 
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